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Lack of access to finance is argued to be one of the most binding constraints for 
firm growth. Faced with financing constraints that raise their cost of capital, 
small firms fail to build up their capital stock and lower their marginal revenue 
of capital. This paper uses a unique, international, manufacturing dataset to 
examine if financial access indeed lowers firms’ cost of capital. The results show 
that credit access, used as a measure of firm-level financial access, has significant 
negative effect on the cost of capital. The results remain significant when credit 
access is instrumented with indicators of firms’ political connections. Taking 
advantage of the large country coverage of the dataset, I also relate firms’ cost of 
capital to country-level measures of financial development and find that financial 
development reduces the cost of capital. These findings confirm that financial 
access allows firms to employ more capital.  
 
 
Key words: cost of capital; finance; credit constraints; political connection.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Lack of financial access is argued to be one of the most binding constraints for 
the growth of small firms, especially in developing countries (Dinh et al., 2010). 
Financially constrained firms are likely to face higher cost of capital which 
inhibits them from investing and building up their capital stock. When sources of 
external financing are limited, firms are forced to rely on internal funds for 
financing their investment expenditure. However, the maximum amount of 
internal funds a firm can mobilize is limited by the profit it can generate. The 
result is that small–sized firms that apparently make small profit will under-
invest and remain small. Studies have shown that the size-distribution of firms 
tends to be dominated by small firms in countries where financing constraints 
are more severe (Angelini and Generale, 2008).   
Despite the great emphasis on financial constraints in the literature, there is 
limited empirical evidence on the link between access to finance and the cost of 
capital. The standard approach of examining the importance of financial 
constraints is by indirectly testing if the availability of cash flow affects 
investment. Studies find that cash flow has a positive and stronger effect on 
investment in sub-samples that are considered more likely to face financing 
constraints (Fazzari et al., 1988; Hubbard, 1998). However, the cash-flow 
sensitivity approach has been criticized for suffering from endogeneity problems 
since cash flow could proxy the future investment potential of firms 
(Schiantarelli, 1996; Hubbard, 1998). The focus of much of the literature is also 
limited to large, stock market listed firms in developed countries with little 
attention given to small- and medium-sized firms in developing countries that 
are particularly affected by credit constraints (Beck et al., 2007; Dinh et al., 2010).  
This study attempts to measure the cost of capital firms face and investigate its 
relationship with financial access. Using the profit maximization assumption that 
firms equate their marginal cost with their marginal revenue, I indirectly 
measure the cost of capital from the marginal revenue product of capital. I then 
relate the cost of capital to country-level indicators of financial development and 
firm-level indicators of credit access.  
The empirical analysis is based on the World Bank’s Enterprises Survey (WBES) 
dataset which provides large, comparable international firm-level data covering 
84 developing countries. The WBES dataset is unique compared to datasets used 
in previous studies because, in addition to its extensive country coverage, it 
primarily covers small- and medium-sized firms. The large country coverage of 
the dataset allows us to look into the effect of cross-country differences in 
financial development on firms’ cost of capital. In addition, the WBES dataset 
provides a number of firm-level indicators of credit access that are consistently 
measured across countries. This enables us to focus on credit access from banks 
and other financial institutions which are the major source of external financing 
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for firms in developing countries where stock markets are either underdeveloped 
or absent (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2004).1  
There is an endogeneity problem in regressions that link firm-level indicators of 
credit access with the cost of capital. Studies indicate that, because of information 
asymmetries, the ability of the firm to access external financing depends 
positively on its net worth that can be used as collateral (Hubbard, 1998; 
Schiantarelli, 1996). Firms with more capital stock and thus larger net worth will, 
therefore, have higher credit access. However, the cost of capital itself is derived 
from the marginal revenue of capital using capital stock data. Thus both the cost 
of capital and credit access will be co-determined by the capital stock, leading to 
an endogeneity problem. To address the endogeneity of credit access, I 
instrument it with indicators of firms’ political connections with government 
regulators. Studies have shown that politically connected firms have higher 
access to bank finance (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Brandt and Li, 2003; Zhou, 2009). 
Since the strength of political connection is exogenous to determinants of the cost 
of capital such as capital stock, it serves as a useful instrument for credit access.   
The use of country-level measures of financial development, on the other hand, 
does not lead to endogeneity problems since the level of financial development is 
given for the firm. The results show that financial access, measured both at firm-
level and at country-level, is negatively correlated with firms’ cost of capital. The 
coefficients of credit access on the cost of capital remain large and significant 
when instrumental variable approach is used. The results provide strong 
evidence that financial access lowers firms’ cost of capital and allows them to 
build up their capital stock.  
The subject of this study is related to a number of important strands of literature. 
Firstly, the paper is related to the vast literature that examines the importance of 
credit constraints. This includes the literature that looks into the sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow (Fazzari et al., 1988; Hubbard, 1998; Guariglia et al., 
2011). A recent study by Guariglia et al. (2011) finds that investment is sensitive 
to the availability of cash flow among privately-owned among Chinese firms 
whereas this is not so among publicly-owned firms, confirming that public firms 
have better financial access due to their political connections. Other recent 
studies in this area have examined if financial development reduces the effect of 
credit constraints on investment. Love (2003), Love and Zicchino (2006), and 
Becker and Sivadasan (2010) find that financial development reduces the 
negative effect of financial constraints on investment.   
There are also a number of studies that use alternative approaches to test the 
presence of credit constraints. De Mel et al. (2008) conduct an experimental study 
to examine the effect of random cash and in-kind grants on the returns of micro-
                                                 
1 Many of the countries in the WBES dataset are identified as “financially underdeveloped and 
bank-based” in the financial structure dataset of Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2004).  
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enterprises. They find that firms exposed to these grants are able to increase their 
profit rate as well as capital stock, suggesting credit constraints. Banerjee and 
Duflo (2008) test the presence of credit constraints among Indian firms by 
looking into the effects of exogenous changes in priority bank borrowing. They 
find that an exogenous increase in priority borrowing leads to an expansion of 
sales and profit which they interpret as indicative of credit constraints. An earlier 
study by Carpenter and Petersen (2002) in the same vein also found that the 
growth of firms is constrained by availability of internal finance. Beck et al. (2007) 
use a version of the WBES dataset that covers 48 countries to investigate how 
financial and institutional development affects the financial access of large and 
small firms. They find that small firms have lower access to bank credit although 
this is less likely to happen in countries with better institutions.     
This study is also related to the literature of resource allocation that studies the 
sources of distortions in factor and product markets and their effect on aggregate 
productivity (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008; Dollar and 
Wei, 2007). In these studies, differences in measured marginal costs of labor and 
capital are considered to imply high distortions. This paper provides ample 
evidence that financial constraints indeed raise the marginal cost of capital. 
Studies in this literature also reveal that there are considerable differences in the 
marginal cost of capital among firms in the same market, implying misallocation 
of capital (Dollar and Wei, 2007; Banerjee and Munshi, 2004). Our results also 
highlight that the allocation of credit by political connections could be one 
channel that induces misallocation.  
The contribution of this paper is threefold. Firstly, the paper provides 
comparable measures of the cost of capital by exploiting insights from the recent 
resource allocation literature (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Restuccia and Rogerson, 
2008). Measuring the user cost of capital for developing country firms is 
problematic because of the difficulty to estimate the opportunity cost of financial 
capital since financial markets in these countries are inefficient. Even when 
available, the observed cost of debt and equity can give little information about 
the opportunity cost of capital for small- and medium-sized firms that make little 
or no use of external financing. Perhaps for these reasons, there has been limited 
effort to measure the cost of capital of small developing country firms. This study 
circumvents this problem by using a production function approach to provide 
measures of the cost of capital that are comparable across countries.  
The second contribution of the paper is that it investigates the effects of 
differences in financial access both within and across countries using unique 
international data. Much of the existent cross-country literature on financial 
access ignores the large financial access differences within countries by 
exclusively focusing on macro-level measures of financial development (Levine, 
2005). The paper shows that both within- and between-country differences in 
financial access are important determinants of firms’ cost of capital. In addition, 
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the dataset used in this study is more relevant than those used in previous 
studies because it primarily covers small- and medium- sized firms from 
developing countries that are more subject to credit constraints. 
Finally, the study provides a novel way of identifying causality between access to 
finance and the cost of capital. Using the exogenous effect of political connections 
on credit access, the paper establishes a plausible causal link between access to 
finance and the cost of capital.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a detailed 
discussion of the empirical strategy. Section 3 discusses the measurement of key 
variables and provides some descriptive statistics.  Section 4 presents the 
regression results. Section 5 deals with robustness tests and section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Empirical strategy  
Firms provide capital services to themselves instead of buying it from the 
market. The cost of capital is thus unobserved and its user cost has to be imputed 
using information about the opportunity cost of financial capital. In countries 
where financial markets are well developed, the weighted average of the cost of 
debt and equity is used as the opportunity cost of capital (Chirinko et al., 1999). 
There are several reasons why this approach cannot work for small-sized 
developing country firms. Firstly, the observed cost of debt and equity may not 
reflect the true opportunity cost of capital since capital markets are very likely 
inefficient (Bai et al., 2006). Second, capital markets could be segmented and 
observed costs of financial capital might apply for some firms but not for others. 
Specifically, the cost of debt and equity can give little information about the 
opportunity cost of capital for small-sized firms that make little or no use of 
external financing. Finally, financial statement data can be unavailable even for 
those firms that rely on financial markets.2  
An alternative way of measuring the cost of capital is using a production 
function approach.  Economic theory stipulates that profit maximizing firms 
equate their marginal costs with their marginal revenues. This paper relies on the 
marginal revenue product of capital as a measure of the cost of capital because it 
can be easily backed out from revenue and capital stock data. The marginal 




                                                 
2 This is partly because most firms are not publicly listed and thus are not legally obliged to 
release audited financial statements. Only 7 % of the firms in the WBES dataset are publicly 
listed, and the majority (56 %) are private limited companies. In addition, only 55 % of the firms 
prepare audited financial statements. 
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where MCKijc and MRPKijc respectively stand for the marginal cost and the 
marginal revenue of capital of firm i in industry j and country c. Q stands for 
quantity of production, P for output prices3, Y for revenues, and K for capital 
stock. The parameter αj is the output elasticity of capital that is specific to 
industry j.  
Since the marginal revenue product of capital represents the derived demand for 
capital, it expresses the maximum amount firms are willing to pay for a unit of 
capital. At low levels of capital stock, firms are willing to pay higher for a unit of 
capital; but their willingness to pay falls as their capital stock grows and its 
marginal revenue diminishes. The firm chooses its profit maximizing level of 
capital stock by equalizing its marginal revenue of capital with its marginal cost. 
Although the marginal cost of capital a firm faces is not observed for the 
researcher, it can be implied from the marginal revenue of capital which 
indicates the firm’s location on its demand curve. Ceteris paribus, firms with high 
values of marginal revenue and low level of capital stock face high cost of capital 
and vice versa.  
The goal of our empirical strategy is to test if increased financial access is 
associated with lower cost of capital. In order to correctly identify the effect of 
financial access on the cost of capital, it is necessary to control for factors that can 
induce differences in demand for capital. For example, productivity differences 
induce differences in demand because more productive firms with higher 
marginal revenues are willing to pay higher cost for a unit of capital. 
Productivity differences and other demand shifters should thus be controlled to 
avoid wrongly attributing differences in capital demand to financial access. In 
addition, when the goal is to identify the effect of a particular type of financial 
access, other sources of finance that could lower the cost of capital need to be 
controlled.  
Two groups of indicators of access to finance are used to explain firms’ cost of 
capital. The first group of indicators is measured at firm-level and indicates the 
level of firms’ credit access. The second group of indicators includes country-
level measures of financial development. The following sub-sections present the 
empirical strategy for relating the two groups of financial access indicators with 
firms’ cost of capital.   
 
 
                                                 
3 At this point we assume that firms are price takers, which is a necessary condition for the 
equality relationship between marginal cost and marginal revenues. In the regression analysis, 
price differences and sector effects are accounted for to remove possible markup differences 
















































2.1. The cost of capital and credit access  
Two indicators of credit access are used: the proportion of credit financing in total 
investment expenditure and the proportion of credit financing in working capital. 
Both indicators are measured at firm-level and higher values indicate higher 
credit access.  
Firm-level indicators of credit access offer two important advantages compared 
to country-level measures. Firstly, they capture heterogeneity in the use of credit 
among firms. This is important since studies indicate that input market 
distortions such as credit constraints could affect firms in the same country 
differently (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Dollar and Wei, 2007). Secondly, firm-level 
measures of credit access enable us to explain the cost of capital by including 
country effects, thus reducing omitted variable bias. This makes it possible to use 
cross-country data while at the same time controlling for different sources of 
heterogeneity across countries.        
I specify the following regression:  
  
                                                      
where ckijc denotes the log of cost of capital for firm i in industry j in country c; 
and Credit_Access refers to one of the two indicators of credit access. Controls 
stands for firm-level demand shifters; JD and CD respectively refer to industry 
and country dummies; and ε is the error term.  
Since more credit access lowers the cost of capital, the expected sign of the 
coefficient for credit access in Equation 4 is negative. Two firm-level demand 
shifters are included in the above regression – revenue productivity and wage 
rate. Firms with higher revenue productivity will have higher demand for capital 
since each unit of capital will produce more return. Similarly, higher marginal 
cost of labor will increase demand for capital by inducing firms to substitute 
labor for capital. Both revenue productivity and wage rate raise the cost firms are 
willing to pay for a unit of capital, and thus are expected to have positive 
coefficients in Equation 2. The measurement of revenue productivity is discussed 
in section 3.1. Wage rate is calculated as total labor cost in USD divided by 
employment. High wage rate can be understood as implying that the firm is 
facing wage distortion for reasons such as unionization (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; 
Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008).4   
Finally, country and industry dummies are included to capture differences across 
industries and countries in the demand for and supply of capital. They also 
remove any possible cross-country differences that do not vary across firms 
including macro-economic shocks and measurement differences. 
                                                 
4 In addition to labor market distortions, wage rate differences could also reflect differences in 
human capital such as the level of employees’ training and skills. Since productive firms are more 
likely to pay higher wages, controlling for productivity will likely alleviate this problem. 
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The regression framework proposed above relies on the assumption that the shift 
in the supply of capital due to credit access is exogenous to the cost of capital. If 
credit access is correlated with the error term in Equation 2, its coefficient can be 
estimated with bias. Studies indicate that, because of information asymmetries, 
the ability of the firm to access external financing depends positively on its net 
worth that can be used as collateral (Hubbard, 1998; Schiantarelli, 1996). Since 
capital stock is an important part of firms’ total net worth, firms with larger 
capital stock will have higher credit access. However, the cost of capital itself is 
derived from capital stock data. Thus both the cost of capital and credit access 
are co-determined by the capital stock, leading to an endogeneity problem. 
Failing to account for this will lead to OLS estimates for credit access that are 
biased downward. It is, however, difficult to know the direction of the bias in the 
OLS coefficient of credit access a priori since there could be multiple sources of 
endogeneity.5  
I use instrumental variable approach to address this endogeneity problem. The 
instruments are different indicators of firms’ connections with government 
regulators and possibly with government banks. A wide range of studies suggest 
that firms that successfully embed their operations in social networks have 
higher credit access (Fafchamps, 2000; Uzzi, 2004; Banerjee and Munshi, 2004). 
More specifically, studies show that in less developed financial markets, and 
especially in developing countries where public banks are predominant, 
politically connected firms get preferential access to finance (Khwaja and Mian, 
2005; Brandt and Li, 2003; Zhou, 2009). Since political connections have no 
theoretical relationship with the cost of capital, differences in credit access 
predicted by political connections will be exogenous. Political connections can 
thus be used to get unbiased estimates for the effect of credit access on the cost of 
capital. I measure firms’ political connections using their response on how 
binding government regulation is as a business constraint. Section 3.4 discusses 
the instruments and their measurement.  
 
 
                                                 
5 Another source of endogeneity is that credit access could capture the effects of unobserved 
future profit potentials. Since firms with higher future profit potential are likely to get more 
credit and are also likely to have higher marginal costs (revenues), this will cause an upward bias 
in the OLS estimates of credit access. This is similar to the critique in the cash flow-sensitivity 
literature that the cash flow variable could proxy the profitability potential of the firm. Most 
studies address this problem by including the market value to replacement ratio of the capital 
stock (Tobin’s Q) to control for future profit potentials. However, this approach has been 
criticized since the marginal Tobin’s Q can be inaccurately measured (Hubbard, 1998; 
Schiantarelli, 1996). Our equivalent control for Tobin’s Q is productivity, which is also a shifter of 
the demand for capital. Although productivity can be considered the best alternative for firms in 
our dataset most of which are not listed in stock markets, it is not forward looking and probably 
does not fully solve the endogeneity problem.  
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2.2. The cost of capital and financial development  
In the previous section, the cost of capital is regressed on firm-level indicators of 
credit access. The aim here is to look into the effect of financial development on 
firms’ cost of capital by exploiting the cross-country dimension of the dataset. 
Although country-level, macro measures of financial access fail to take into 
account differences in financial access across firms, they have an important 
advantage of being exogenous. Unlike firm-level measures of access to finance, 
country-level indicators of financial development are given for the firm and thus 
are not determined by its productivity or capital stock. The extensive country 
coverage of the WBES dataset thus provides an excellent source of exogenous 
variation in financial access that can be exploited to explain firms’ cost of capital.  
Two measures of financial development are used: the net interest margin, and the 
lending interest rate. Both the interest rate margin or lending interest rate indicate 
higher cost of financial capital and lower access to finance, and thus will have a 
positive effect on the cost of capital.  
I estimate the following regression:  
  
                                                      
where ck is the log of cost of capital; FinDev is an indicator of financial 
development; Controls refers to a set of controls; JD  refers to industry dummies; 
and ε is the error term.   
Firm-level measures of revenue productivity and wage rate are controlled in 
Equation 5 to account for differences of demand for capital. As indicated earlier, 
both controls are expected to increase firm’s demand for capital, and thus will 
have positive coefficients.  
Cross-country differences in demand for and supply of capital should also be 
controlled to get an unbiased estimate for the effect of financial development on 
the cost of capital. To start with, I include an indicator of capital account 
openness to control for differences in access to foreign finance. In addition, I 
control for four demand-side determinants of capital use that could vary across 
countries. The first control is the relative price of physical capital, which 
measures the price of capital goods that is required to generate one unit of 
revenue. Firms in countries with high relative price of capital will substitute 
labor for capital, leading to lower demand for capital (Hsieh and Klenow, 2007; 
Caselli and Feyrer, 2007). Secondly, trade openness is controlled to specifically 
account for price differences of tradable goods.6 Third, I control for the country-
                                                 
6 A country’s relative price of physical capital is usually measured by the ratio of the investment 
price level, which indicates the price level of a basket of investment goods, to the consumption price 
level, which measures the price level of a basket of consumer goods. Since the consumer price 
level is generated using both traded and non-traded consumption goods (i.e. services), trade 
( ) ( ) ( ),3ijcjjijccijc JDControlsFinDevck εδγβα ++++= ∑
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average wage rate in manufacturing to account for differences in labor cost. 
Finally, an indicator of labor market rigidity is included. Both wage rate and 
labor market rigidity make labor more expensive relative to capital, leading to 
higher demand for capital. The measurement and data source of these controls is 
provided by Appendix A.  
Where country-level variables are used to explain a firm-level response variable, 
the standard errors will be correlated within each country because firms 
operating in one country share other unobservable characteristics. Failing to 
account for the clustering of standard errors will cause a downward bias in the 
standard errors (Donald and Lang, 2007). Therefore, Equation 3 is estimated 
using robust standard errors that are adjusted for clustering by country groups. 
Since the cross-section dataset covers 84 countries, the number of country groups 
will be large enough to ensure that the t-statistic is normally distributed.   
 
3. Data and measurement   
3.1. Measuring the cost of capital and productivity  
To measure the marginal cost of capital as given by Equation 1, one needs 
unbiased estimates for the output elasticity of capital αj. The elasticity parameter 
can be derived from the data either by econometrically estimating a production 
function or by directly imputing factor shares in value added. In both cases, the 
imputed output elasticity parameters are assumed to correctly characterize the 
technology. However, recent studies emphasize that firms could face 
idiosyncratic distortions for input prices that affect their input mix decision 
(Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008). This implies that the 
output elasticity of capital could vary across firms that use the same technology. 
Further, sectoral differences in measured output elasticity values could reflect 
government subsidies and other distortions that affect the use of capital across 
industries instead of inherent technological differences.  
The recent literature on factor allocation and distortions provides some 
alternative ways of measuring the marginal revenue of capital. Instead of 
assuming elasticity parameters that could be wrongly estimated, one alternative 
is making the simplifying assumption that output elasticity parameters do not 
vary across industries. Setting αj in Equation 1 to unity yields the average 




                                                                                                                                                  
openness is included to specifically account for price level differences in tradable goods across 
countries.  
















where Y and K are value added and capital stock. Both value added and capital 
stock are nominal values in local currency. Since CK1 is a ratio, it needs no 
corrections to be comparable across countries.  
The average revenue product of capital has the appealing feature of being 
proportional to the marginal revenue product of capital when all industries have 
Cobb-Douglas technology. This measure has also been used in previous studies 
as a measure of capital return (Dollar and Wei, 2003). However, the average 
revenue product of capital attributes all factor returns to capital and will 
certainly over-estimate the marginal revenue and cost of capital.  
Alternatively, the marginal revenue of capital can be measured using some 
‘undistorted’ elasticity parameters. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) calculate the 
marginal factor returns of a ‘distorted’ economy by using industry production 
elasticity parameters observed from another less distorted economy. The idea is 
that output elasticity parameters that are observed in a market in which input 
prices are less distorted are more likely to characterize the ‘real’ technology of a 
given industry. Since the U.S. input market is arguably the most competitive, 
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) use input shares from the U.S. for estimating factor 
marginal revenues in other countries, namely India and China.  
Following this line of reasoning, I compute the marginal cost of capital from its 
marginal revenue using industry-level elasticity parameters from U.S. data: 
 
                                                                                                                                      
where CK2 stands for the marginal cost of capital. The parameter αjUS is the value 
added share of capital measured as one minus the labor share of the industry in 
the U.S. (by constant returns to scale assumption).  
CK1 is based on the average product of capital by attributing all returns to 
capital, and CK2 is based on the marginal revenue of capital using U.S. value 
added shares. At the other extreme, one can also assume that each firm has its 
own production technology, and therefore has distinct elasticity parameters. This 
could be the case if, due to unequal access to technology, firms end up with 
different production structures even if they operate in the same industry.  
In this case the share of operating profit in revenues from the data can be used as 
output elasticity of capital for each firm: 
  
         ,                                                                                     
                                                                              
where CK3 refers to the third measure of the cost of capital; wL stands for labor 
cost in local currency and; α is the firm-specific share of operating profit in total 















































Dollar and Wei (2007) use this approach to measure the marginal revenue of 
capital in their analysis of capital allocation among Chinese firms. Similarly, 
Felipe et al. (2008) note that the profit rate is important for factor in the allocation 
of capital because it affects the availability of finance for investment. Although 
CK3 is interesting because it is based on the “actual” return of capital, it cannot 
be used as a realistic measure of cost of capital since it is not based on any 
underlying production technology.7  
The regression analysis will be based on log-transformed values of the first 
measure of cost of capital (CK1). Since CK2 differs from CK1 only by industry-
level parameters, the coefficient of financial access will be the same for the two 
measures when industry dummies are included. CK3 is used for descriptive 
statistics purposes, but not for regression analysis since the absence of common 
technology makes its interpretation difficult.  
In the regression models given by Equation 2 and Equation 3, revenue 
productivity is included to account for differences in demand for capital due to 
productivity and price differences. Ideally, output prices and physical 
productivity should be included separately in the regressions. Unfortunately, 
output price data is not available in our dataset, so we cannot separately account 
for the two demand shifters. Instead, revenue productivity, which is the product 
of prices and physical productivity, is included. Total factor productivity of 
revenue (TFPR) is calculated using Cobb-Douglas technology and U.S. elasticity 
parameters:   









where L is measured as labor compensation instead of employment because the 
former better reflects differences in hours worked and human capital per worker. 
The output elasticity of labor (1-αjUS) is calculated as the value added share of 
labor. Data for calculating U.S. industry elasticity parameters is taken from the 
STAN database, and the values for output elasticity parameters are given in 
Appendix C.   
 
3.2 Data sources and variable definition   
This section discusses data sources and the measurement of key variables. 
Although I use supplementary data from other sources, much of the data for 
analysis comes from the World Bank’s Enterprises Survey (WBES) dataset. I will, 
therefore, describe the WBES dataset and introduce the variables used for 
measuring the cost of capital and access to finance.  
                                                 
7 Differences in measured marginal cost among firms that have the same production technology 
provide information about supply side distortions that raise or lower factor cost. When there is 
no underlying technology, however, all differences in marginal cost are optimal outcomes.  
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A) The WBES dataset   
The World Bank’s Enterprises Survey is an ongoing survey that collects firm-
level data worldwide. The survey covers extensive topics with dozens of 
questions related to firm performance and productivity (sales, labor and capital) 
as well as firms’ ratings on various aspects of the business environment. 
Although the analysis in this paper is based on manufacturing data only, the 
survey targets both manufacturing and service firms that are formally registered 
and have five or more employees.   
The major advantage of the WBES survey is that data collection is conducted 
systematically using standardized survey instruments. The dataset thus provides 
comparable data that is unique for its extensive country coverage. Sampling for 
the WBES is conducted using stratified sampling procedure to ensure 
representation. First, the number industry groups to be covered in each major 
sector (services, manufacturing and non-agriculture primary activities) is 
determined. For manufacturing, industry grouping is based on two-digit ISIC 
classification. The number of industry groups to be covered in each country is 
determined according to the size of the total economy which is considered to be a 
proxy for the universe of firms. Once the number of industries is decided, 
industry groups that contribute relatively more to the total economy in terms of 
total production or employment are selected. In the second stage, a sampling 
equation is used to determine a representative sample size per industry group. 
Finally, further stratification is made based on firm-size and geographical 
location to choose which firms are included in the survey.8 
Data collection started in 2002, and as of 2011 the dataset covers more than 
120,000 observations across 125 countries. Panel data is available for some 
countries; however, the country coverage of the panel dataset is limited. To make 
the most use of available data, I use two selected sets of the dataset. The main 
analysis will be done using a cross-section dataset that combines data from 
different countries to maximize total available data. When multiple years of data 
are available for one country, the cross-section dataset contains the year for 
which the number of observations is the largest.  
I started compiling the cross-section data by removing repeated (panel) 
observations, non- manufacturing firms, and observations with missing or 
incomplete data. Then I checked for the presence of outliers using the share of 
labor in value added and the capital-value added ratio. I removed observations 
below the 1st and above the 99th percentiles of the two ratios to reduce bias from 
measurement error. After cleaning, the cross-section dataset contains 21,847 
manufacturing firms in 84 countries across 11 industries.  
                                                 
8 A full description of the sampling procedure can be accessed from the website of the dataset: 
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/methodology/ 
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The number of observations per country, the year of data collection, and 
summary statistics for other key variables is provided in Appendix B. There is a 
large difference in sample size across countries; whereas large countries such as 
India, Brazil and China have well above a thousand observations, smaller ones 
such as Gambia and Albania have only 20-30 observations. The dataset covers 
mostly low- and middle-income countries with an average per capita GDP of 
USD 5,550 in 2005. The country with the highest income is Czech Republic (USD 
20,362) and the one with the lowest income is Congo Democratic Republic (USD 
266), all in constant PPP prices.   
In addition to the cross-section dataset, I also use a smaller panel dataset in order 
to check the robustness of the results. After cleaning, the panel dataset includes 
close to 3,000 observations in 12 countries. The length of the panel is two years 
for 80% of the firms and three years for the remaining 20%.  
The mean and median levels of employment are respectively 182 and 40 in the 
cross-section dataset, and 191 and 49 in the panel dataset. In both datasets, 
around 70 % of the observations are small- and medium-sized enterprises with 
100 or fewer employees.  
 
B) Variables for measuring cost of capital and productivity 
The cost of capital in this paper is measured in three different ways, explained in 
equations 4 to 6. For this purpose, data on total production, intermediate inputs 
capital stock, and labor cost is required. Market value of production is not 
available for most firms, and so the more widely available data of total sales is 
used. In the cross-section dataset, a small number of firms have data for market 
value of their production, but not for their total sales. For these firms, market 
value of production is used. However, this will not cause systematic bias since 
the two measures have a correlation of almost one among firms that report both 
values. Cost of intermediate inputs is calculated by adding up three major cost 
categories: energy consumption (fuel, electricity and other energy costs), cost of 
raw materials and overhead and other expenses. Value added is measured as the 
difference between sales and cost of intermediate inputs.  
Two alternative measures of capital stock are available in the WBES dataset. The 
first is the end of year net book value of the capital stock, and the second is the 
replacement value of the capital stock in its existing state9. Both measures are 
generated by summing up values for two types of capital: i) machinery, vehicles, 
                                                 
9 The replacement value of the capital stock is generated by directly asking firms how much they 
would pay to re-buy their capital stock. Respondents are first asked about the net book value of 
their capital stock before being asked about the replacement value which reduces the risk of 
under- or over-stating replacement values. The median ratio of the replacement cost to net book 
value of the capital stock across all firms is 1.42, suggesting that the replacement value  is around 
40% higher than the net book value.  
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and equipment and ii) land and buildings. In the cross-section dataset, I use the 
net book value of capital stock since it is the most widely available measure. In 
the smaller panel dataset, the replacement value is also widely available. Since 
the replacement value of capital stock is closer to the productive capital stock 
because it reflects changes in the price of capital, I use it as a measure of the 
capital stock in the panel dataset. However, around 15% of the observations in 
the panel dataset report only the net book value of their capital stock. For these 
observations, the net book value capital stock is used after it is converted to 
replacement-value equivalent. To calculate the replacement-value equivalent 
from the net book value, I use the country-median of the ratio of the replacement 
to net book value of capital stock among firms that report both values. 
 
C) Measures of access to finance 
As indicated earlier, I use two groups of indicators of access to finance. The first 
group consists of two firm-level indicators of credit access that measure how 
much credit firms use. The second group contains two country-level measures of 
financial development that reflect cross-country differences in access to finance.  
The two firm-level measures of credit access are taken from the WBES dataset. 
The first measure is the proportion of credit use in firms’ total investment 
expenditure on fixed assets such as land, buildings, machinery and equipment. 
The second measure is the proportion of credit use in firms’ total working capital 
expense for short term production activities such as purchases of inputs, covering 
wage bills, etc. The two measures include all forms of credit financing from 
banks and non-bank financial institutions. Specifically, they include i) formal 
loans, overdraft withdrawal, and other forms of credit from local and foreign 
commercial banks; and ii) financing from investment funds or other government-
sponsored development financing mechanisms. However, the two measures of 
credit access exclude other forms of external financing such as leasing, trade 
credit, loans from informal financial institutions, and loans from social sources. 
The data for these measures is collected by directly asking top managers and/or 
owners of the firm who answer by referring to financial statements whenever 
possible.  
The second group of financial access indicators consists of two country-level 
measures of financial development, namely: (i) the net interest margin, and (ii) 
the lending interest rate. The net interest margin indicates the wedge between 
banks’ lending and deposit interest rates. It thus measures the cost of 
intermediation; high values indicate inefficient intermediation and lower credit 
availability for borrowers (Beck and Heiko, 2009; Beck et al., 2009). As a cost of 
borrowing, the lending interest rate also measures the efficiency of financial 
intermediation. Although the literature offers several measures of financial 
development including indicators of the size of the financial intermediary sector 
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(Levine, 2005), efficiency-based measures are used in this paper because they 
have a more direct relationship with the cost of financial capital.   
Data for the net interest margin and the lending interest rate was taken 
respectively from the financial development dataset by Beck et al. (2009) and the 
World Development Indicators (WDI) database. For both variables, averaged 
data for the years from 2001-2007 is used to avoid measurement problems related 
to year to year fluctuations.  
Description of all the variables used in the paper and their source is provided by 
Appendix A. A brief descriptive result for the four measures of access to finance 
and other variables by country is also provided in Appendix B.  
 
3.3. Summary statistics of key variables   
This sub-section presents descriptive statistics for key variables. Table 1 provides 
summary statistics and variance decomposition by country for the three 
measures of cost of capital and the two groups of indicators of financial access. 
The variance decomposition, depicted in the last columns of Table 1, clearly 
shows that the largest share of total variation both of the cost of capital and of 
credit access lies within countries. This highlights the importance of 
understanding within-country variations in credit access and their effect on 
firms’ cost of capital.  
The first panel of Table 1 provides summary statistics for the three measures of 
cost of capital. There is a strong correlation between the three measures; CK1 has 
a correlation of 0.95 both with CK2 and CK3, and the later have a correlation of 
0.92. Not surprisingly, their summary statistics are markedly different as shown 
in Table 1; CK1 has a mean of 4.42 and a median of 1.42, and CK2 has a mean of 
1.63 and a median of 0.51. The third measure, CK3, has average and median 
values of 3.15 and 0.79 respectively.  
How reasonable are these measures as indicators of the cost of capital? Since the 
data covers a large number of countries it is more informative to look at the 
average and median values by country. The country average and median values 
for the three measures of cost of capital are presented in Appendix B. There are 
notable differences between mean and median values, suggesting the presence of 
extreme values. The analysis in subsequent sections will thus be based on log-
transformed values of cost of capital to reduce bias from outliers.10  
                                                 
10 An additional issue to note in Appendix II is that there appears to be cross-country differences 
in measured cost of capital. A few countries such as Indonesia have notably higher cost of capital 
whereas countries like Syria appear to have markedly lower cost of capital. This suggests the 
presence of systematic differences across countries in the way the cost of capital is imputed. One 
possible explanation is discrepancy in prices because of different rates of inflation across 
countries. Since revenues are measured in current prices and capital stock in historical prices, 
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Several studies show that the return to capital in developing countries can 
substantially exceed the market interest rate (de Mel et al, 2008; Banerjee and 
Duflo, 2008; Anagol and Udry, 2006; Siba, 2011). Compared to these previous 
findings, the median values of CK2 seem reasonable estimates of the marginal 
revenue (cost) of capital.11 In general, the relatively high values of cost of capital 
could reflect the high risk of operating in a developing country and/or higher 
cost of capital.    
Table 1.  Descriptive statistics and variance decomposition of key variables.  
 
Panel II of Table 1 shows that, on average, firms use credit from banks and other 
financial institutions to cover around 20% of their investment and working 
capital financing expenditure. In addition to the use of credit, the WBES dataset 
also provides data on the percentage of internal funds firms use for financing 
their investment and working capital expenditures. Although not reported in 
Table 1, internal funds on average constitute 36% and 48% of firm’s total 
investment and working capital expenditure.12 The use of internal funds is hence 
                                                                                                                                                  
marginal revenue can appear higher in countries with higher inflation. To address this, I control 
for price differences in the cross-country regressions. I also include country dummies in most of 
the regression analysis in the next sections to account for possible measurement differences.  
11 Using manufacturing data of Ethiopian firms, Siba (2011) finds that the median return to capital 
is 17-21% in the formal sector and 51-122% in the informal sector. de Mel et al. (2008) find that 
cash and in-kind grants for microenterprises in Sri Lanka increase returns by over 60% per year. 
Banerjee and Duflo (2008) report increases in priority lending in India leads to a net return on 
borrowing of 73%. Anagol and Udry (2006) estimate the opportunity cost of capital in Ghana’s 
informal sector from price differences in auto parts, and find a real return to capital of 60%. 
Finally, Bai et al. (2006) find a return to capital of around 20% for the aggregate economy of China 
using a similar approach as ours.  
12 These figures also reveal that other sources of external financing are very important, 
contributing to more than one third of firms’ total financing needs. We will come back to this 
issue in section 5.1. The zero median values for credit use in investment and working capital are 








I.  The Cost of capital  
1.  CK1 21,847 4.42 1.42 10.43 87 13 
2.  CK2 21,847 1.63 0.51 4.10 88 12 
3.  CK3 21,847 3.15 0.79 8.59 87 13 
 
II.  Firm-level measures of access to finance 
1.  Credit use in investment  15,718  0.21 0.00 0.35 82 18 
2.  Credit use in working capital  18,302 0.20 0.00 0.31 83 17 
 
III. Country-level  measures of access to finance  
1. Net interest margin (%) 18,525 5.86 6.00  2.59   
2. Lending interest rate (%) 20,298 17.81 14.75 11.60   
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around two times as large as the use of credit, suggesting credit constraints. The 
correlation between the proportional contributions of credit and internal funds 
for investment is negative and strongly significant with a coefficient of -0.46. The 
correlation between the proportional contribution of credit and internal funds for 
working capital is even larger with a coefficient of -0.58. The large negative 
correlation between the two sources of financing is indicative of the presence of 
credit constraints since it implies that firms with limited access to external 
borrowing are forced to rely on internal funds.  
It might appear that credit use in working capital is not relevant for explaining the 
cost of physical capital since it is not related to fixed capital investment. 
However, working capital needs and investment expenditures could compete for 
the same financial resources. Where there are credit constraints, firms with 
higher credit access for working capital might have more internal funds at their 
disposal for investment. High credit access can thus lower firms’ cost of physical 
capital regardless of the purpose for which it is borrowed. Another imperative 
for using credit use in working capital is that it is more likely to reflect financial 
access differences than credit use in investment. Credit use for investment is very 
much likely to reflect differences in demand for finance since only firms with 
positive investment demand will have non-zero credit use for investment. Credit 
use for working capital, on the other hand, is less likely to reflect demand 
differences since all firms have positive demand for working capital. In any case, 
the IV procedure discussed in our empirical strategy section is also aimed at 
addressing possible endogeneity problems related to demand differences both 
for financial and physical capital. The two measures of credit access have a 
strongly significant correlation of 0.56.13 
Panel III provides summary statistics of the two indicators of financial 
development. The average net interest margin is around 6%, which is close to the 
median value Beck et al. (2009) report for low-income countries. Brazil and 
Malawi have the highest net interest margin which stands at 13%. The average 
lending interest rate of around 18% is also very high, reflecting the low-level of 
financial development in the countries in the dataset. The highest lending 
interest rates are 68% and 56% respectively for Angola and Brazil, whereas most 
East European countries have relatively low lending interest rates that are less 
than 10%. The net interest margin and the lending interest rate have a very high 
correlation coefficient of 0.60. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
not unexpected since only 76% of firms report positive investment, and only 56 % of firms have 
any overdraft financing or lines of credit from banks.  
13 Although the availability of cash flow is used as an indicator of credit constraints in much of 
the literature, Sufi (2007) finds that the use of credit in total liquidity, which is very close to our 
measures of credit use in working capital, can be a more relevant indicator of credit constraints.  
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3.4. Political connection indicators  
This sub-section introduces the indicators of political connections that will be 
used as instruments for credit access and motivates why they can be exogenous 
predictors of credit access.   
To get a clear view of the relevance of political connections as instruments for 
credit access, I divide all firms in the dataset into two groups depending on the 
strength of their political connections. The criteria I use for classifying the degree 
of firms’ political connection is the presence of government stake in ownership. 
Firms which are (at least) partly public-owned are considered to be strongly 
politically connected whereas fully privately-owned firms are considered to have 
weaker political connections. Table 2 presents mean comparisons between the 
two groups of firms for sources of financing and political connection indicators. 
Table 2. Indicators of political connectivity: mean comparison between public 
and private firms. 
 Min Max Obs. Average 
Mean 
difference 
(public-private)     Public Private 
 
I. Sources of financing        
1. Credit use in investment  0 1.00 15,144 0.32 0.20 0.12*** 
2. Credit use in work. capital  0 1.00 17,903 0.35 0.20 0.15 *** 
3. Internal fund use investment  0 1.00 20,196 0.24 0.36 -0.12*** 
4. Internal fund use in work capital   0 1.00 19,608 0.24 0.50 -0.25*** 
 
II. Political connection indicators        
 1. % of senior management time 
spent dealing with gov. officials  
0 100 18,787 12.67 11.02 1.65*** 
2. Corruption constraints  0 4 19,773 1.15 1.87 -0.72*** 
3. Tax administration constraints 0 4 19,964 1.12 1.62 -0.50*** 
4. Anti-competitive practices  0 4 19,180 1.23 1.66 -0.43*** 
 
The first panel of Table 2 compares two sources of financing – internal funds and 
credit – for two types of expenditures i.e. investment and working capital 
expenditures. The first two rows reveal that firms with public ownership use 
significantly more credit for meeting their financing needs. In general, credit use 
among public firms is more than 50% higher than among private firms, 
highlighting the large difference in accessing credit between the two groups of 
firms. In contrast, private-owned firms rely significantly more on internal funds 
for financing their investment and working capital expenditure. The contribution 
of internal funds in total expenditure is almost twice among private firms as it is 
among public firms. To sum up, these results suggest that private firms are 
forced to substitute internal funds for credit because they are credit constrained. 
Panel II compares four indicators of firms’ political connections that could 
explain differences in the use of credit. The indicators of political connections 
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come from firms’ responses on how severe government regulation is as a 
business constraint. The first indicator of political connection measures the 
proximity of mangers with regulators by the amount of time they spend 
together. Since more politically connected managers in general will spend more 
time with regulators, this variable can be a good indicator of the closeness of firm 
managers with government officials. Closeness to government regulators could 
enable firms to get better financial concessions because they are in a better 
position to get insider information and/or to influence decisions through 
lobbying. The last three instruments refer to firms’ ratings on the severity of 
regulatory constraints. The second measure, for example, is a response for the 
severity of corruption constraints. The responses are given by a Likert-type 
rating which indicates the severity of the constraint between zero (no obstacle) 
and four (very severe obstacle).  
Mean comparison between public and private firms for the last three indicators 
of political connection reveals that public firms rate business constraints as less 
binding. Public firms also have significantly higher response for the first 
indicator which measures how much time their senior management spends with 
government regulators. Although the interpretation of this variable is not as 
direct as for the others, the high mean for public firms confirms that it measures 
the strength of political connection.  
Results reported in Table 2 show that firms that are more likely to be politically 
connected use larger amounts of credit, and that they also view different 
regulatory constraints as less binding. Firms’ ratings on the regulatory 
constraints can thus be good indicators of their political connections. The results 
also suggest that credit use appears to depend on political connections, and is 
thus very likely to reflect differences in financial access. 
 
4. Regression results 
4.1. The cost of capital and credit access  
This section provides ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variable (IV) 
estimation results for the econometric specification given by Equation 2. The 
regression model is discussed in greater detail in section 2.1. The regressions in 
which credit use in investment is used to measure credit access are reported in 
Table 3, and those based on credit use in working capital are reported in Table 4.  
Six regression results are reported in Table 3: the first three are based on OLS and 
the last three are based on IV. The cost of capital is regressed on only credit 
access and country-industry dummies in regression 1, but revenue productivity 
and wage rate are successively included in regressions 2 and 3. The IV estimates 
for the same regressions are reported in columns 4-6.  
The R-squared values for the OLS regressions increase markedly with the 
inclusion of revenue productivity and wage rate. They rise from 0.16 in 
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regression 1 to around 0.70 in regression 3, indicating the strong heterogeneity 
among firms with respect to productivity and wages. For our preferred 
specification in which both controls are included, the goodness of fit of the model 
is satisfactory. From the first row, the coefficients of credit use in investment 
appear negative and strongly significant in all of the OLS regressions. The size of 
the coefficient for credit use in investment falls somewhat when productivity and 
wage rate are controlled, although its significance does not change.  
Regressions 4-6 are estimated by instrumenting credit access with indicators of 
political connections. The instrumental variable approach is implemented using 
GMM estimation procedure rather than two-stage least squares. The GMM 
procedure is chosen because it is more general and, when there are multiple 
instruments, it uses an optimal weighting matrix to get the most efficient 
estimator from all moment conditions. Because most of the instruments are 
Likert-type and have limited variation within them, I use multiple instruments to 
be able to explain a larger share of the variation in credit access. With four 
instruments but only one endogenous variable, the model is overidentified 
which makes the weighting matrix approach of GMM preferable. Although the 
first stage regressions are not reported to conserve space, the instruments and 
other exogenous variables explain around 20% of the total variation in the two 
measures of credit access.  
Table 3. Credit use in investment and the cost of capital; OLS and IV regression. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Credit in investment  -0.177*** -0.131*** -0.141*** -1.549** -1.102*** -1.111*** 
 (0.032) (0.021) (0.020) (0.683) (0.419) (0.404) 
Revenue productivity, log  1.201*** 1.208***  1.217*** 1.224*** 
  (0.009) (0.008)  (0.011) (0.010) 
Wage rate, log   0.255***   0.269*** 
   (0.010)   (0.011) 
Constant 0.024 -1.249*** -1.436*** 0.022 -1.241*** -1.450*** 
 (0.315) (0.189) (0.178) (0.339) (0.190) (0.177) 
       
Observations 15,177 15,177 14,963 12,599 12,599 12,568 
R-squared 0.157 0.674 0.696 0.054 0.627 0.648 
Hansen's J chi2 test statistic for 
overidentifying restrictions  
   4.124 4.231 2.010 
Sig. overidentifying restrictions     0.248 0.238 0.570 
GMM C statistic chi2 test statistics for 
exogeneity 
   4.326 6.074 6.687 
Sig.  exogeneity test    0.038 0.014 0.010 
Estimator   OLS OLS OLS IV  IV  IV  
Notes: The dependent variable in all regressions is log (CK1). Country and industry dummies are included 
in all regressions and all of the four instruments reported in Table 2 are used in the IV regressions. Robust 
standard errors are given in parenthesis. The asterisks *, ** and *** respectively represent significance at the 
levels of 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01. 
Before proceeding to interpreting the IV estimates, it is important to check the 
tests for the validity of instruments and the endogeneity of credit access which 
are reported in the last rows of Table 3. The Chi-square test statistics for 
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Hansen’s J test of overidentifying restrictions are relatively small, and the null 
hypothesis is not rejected in any of the IV regressions. This shows that the 
correlation between the error term of the second-stage regression and the 
instrumental variables is zero, implying the joint validity of the instruments. 
The last rows of Table 3 provide test results for the endogeneity of credit access. 
The results of this test are useful because OLS will be more efficient if credit 
access is not endogenous. This test is equivalent to testing the significance of the 
error term of the first stage regression in the second stage regression. If the error 
term is insignificant, it would mean that there is no endogenous component to 
the instrumented variable and so OLS estimates would be more efficient. The 
GMM C test statistics given in Table 3 are significant for all regressions, which 
leads us to reject the null hypothesis that credit access is exogenous. Overall, the 
results indicate that credit access should be instrumented since OLS results 
would be biased.  
For the IV regressions 3-6, the coefficients of credit access are all negative, 
significant, and much larger than the OLS coefficients. The size of the coefficient 
also falls substantially when revenue productivity is included. In the preferred 
specification given by regression 6, the coefficient of credit access is around -1.1. 
Since the dependent variable is log-transformed and the independent variable is 
in levels, the coefficient can be modified to give the percentage change in the cost 
of capital that results from a unit change in credit use. Noting that credit access is 
measured as the proportion of credit in total investment expenditure, the result 
indicates that increasing credit financing in investment expenditure by one 
percentage point lowers the cost of capital by 1.1%. That would imply that 
increasing the proportion of credit financing in investment expenditure in 
Guatemala from its present value of around 0.20 close to the level in Peru, 0.30, 
would lower firms’ cost of capital by around 11%. If instead credit use in 
Guatemala could increase to the level in Thailand, which is around 0.60, firms 
could lower their cost of capital by around 44%. Considering that the level of 
credit access is very low in many countries, these results highlight the large 
unexploited potential to lowering firms’ cost of capital.  
In all of the regressions, the coefficients of revenue productivity appear with the 
expected positive sign. The large and significant coefficients of revenue 
productivity indicate its strong positive effect on firms’ demand for capital. Since 
revenue productivity includes the components of physical productivity as well 
as output prices, its effect on demand for capital could be through output price 
or productivity. Wage rate also has the expected positive, albeit smaller, 
coefficients which indicate that firm’s facing high wage rate have higher demand 
for capital.  
The regression results in which credit use in working capital is used to measure 
credit access are reported in Table 4. Again, regressions 1-3 are OLS estimates 
and regressions 4-6 are based on IV. For all IV regressions, the overidentifying 
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restrictions tests are not rejected, and the endogeneity tests are rejected. The tests 
show that the instruments are valid and that IV is a consistent estimator.  
Table 4. Credit use in working capital and the cost of capital; OLS and IV 
regression results.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Credit in working capital  -0.196*** -0.172*** -0.188*** -1.812*** -1.200*** -1.151*** 
 (0.035) (0.022) (0.022) (0.610) (0.366) (0.345) 
Revenue productivity, log  1.195*** 1.201***  1.208*** 1.215*** 
  (0.008) (0.008)  (0.010) (0.009) 
Wage rate, log   0.258***   0.278*** 
   (0.010)   (0.012) 
Constant 0.027 -1.234*** -1.425*** 0.057 -1.208*** -1.428*** 
 (0.305) (0.183) (0.173) (0.328) (0.183) (0.170) 
       
Observations 17,963 17,963 17,646 14,592 14,592 14,536 
R-squared 0.159 0.675 0.697 0.061 0.635 0.662 
Hansen's J chi2 test statistic for 
overidentifying restrictions  
   2.540 2.978 2.419 
Sig. overidentifying restrictions     0.468 0.395 0.490 
GMM C statistic chi2 test statistics for 
exogeneity 
   7.840 8.918 8.730 
Sig. exogeneity    0.005 0.003 0.003 
Estimator   OLS OLS OLS IV  IV  IV  
Notes: The dependent variable in all regressions is log (CK1). Country and industry dummies are included 
in all regressions and all of the four instruments reported in Table 2 are used in the IV regressions. Robust 
standard errors are given in parenthesis. The asterisks *, ** and *** respectively represent significance at the 
levels of 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01. 
The coefficients of credit use in working capital and the control variables in Table 4 
show remarkable similarity with those reported in Table 3. The credit access 
variable has significant and negative coefficients in all regressions, although the 
size of its coefficients changes significantly with the inclusion of the controls. 
Credit use in working capital has a coefficient of around -1.2 in regression 6, 
indicating that raising credit financing in working capital by one percentage 
point reduces the cost of capital by 1.2%. This estimate is only slightly different 
from the coefficient of credit use in investment in the same regression specification. 
The two control variables appear with the expected positive sign and their 
coefficients are very similar to those reported earlier.  
Following this, I present the panel regression results in which the fixed effects 
model is estimated with and without instrumenting credit access. The advantage 
of using the fixed effects is that, being a within estimator, it controls for all group 
effects. This leads to better estimation by reducing the risk of omitted variable 
bias and other misspecification problems.  
Table 5 reports four regression results in which the cost of capital is regressed on 
the two measures of credit access. Regressions 1-2 are based on credit use in total 
investment as a measure of credit access, and regressions 3-4 are based on credit 
use in total working capital. For each measure of credit access, the first column 
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gives the standard fixed effects regression estimate, and the second column gives 
the IV regression result. In all regressions, revenue productivity and wage rate 
are controlled.   
Table 5. Credit access and the cost of capital; fixed effects regression results. 
 Credit use in investment Credit use in working capital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Credit access -0.418*** -4.933** -0.069 -8.515 
 (0.142) (2.327) (0.149) (6.356) 
Revenue productivity, log 1.170*** 1.338*** 1.145*** 1.249*** 
 (0.028) (0.101) (0.027) (0.139) 
Wage rate, log  0.221*** 0.183*** 0.193*** 0.172*** 
 (0.013) (0.028) (0.014) (0.040) 
Constant -3.103*** -2.204*** -2.888*** -1.444* 
 (0.119) (0.277) (0.129) (0.805) 
     
Observations 2,834 1,528 2,964 1,604 
R-squared 0.779  0.716  
Number of groups  1,536 1,195 1,555 1,216 
Sargan-Hansen statistic for 
overidentifying restrictions 
 2.986  3.163 
Sig. Sargan-Hansen. test  0.394  0.367 
Estimator    Fixed effects Fixed effects, IV Fixed effects Fixed effects, IV 
Note: The dependent variable in all regressions is log (CK1). The top row indicates which indicator of credit 
access is used in the regressions. Where credit access is not instrumented, the standard errors are corrected 
for clustering by firm group. All of the four instruments reported in Table 2 are used in the IV regressions. 
The asterisks *, ** and *** respectively represent significance at the levels of 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01. 
The last rows of Table 5 report the overidentifying restrictions tests for the 
validity of the instruments. The overidentifying restrictions are not rejected for 
both IV regressions, confirming that the instruments are valid. The R-squared 
values for the standard fixed effects estimates range between 0.5 and 0.8, 
indicating reasonable goodness of fit.   
The first row of Table 5 reveals that the two measures of credit access have mixed 
significance. Credit use in investment is significant both in the OLS and IV 
estimates, whereas credit use in working capital is significant in neither of them. 
For both measures of credit access, the IV estimates yield larger coefficients of 
credit access, indicating that standard fixed effects causes upward bias. The 
coefficients of credit access from the IV fixed effects estimator are also much 
larger than those from the cross-section data. The results of regression 2 indicate 
that an increase in credit use in total investment expenditure by one percentage 
point lowers the cost of capital by almost 5%, which is more than four times 
larger than what is found in the cross-section data.  
The results from the fixed effects estimates are less consistent compared to those 
from the cross-section data. A possible explanation for the insignificance of credit 
use in working capital in the panel data is that the variable does not vary 
sufficiently over time. Especially when credit access is instrumented, this could 
be because the instrumental variables that indicate political connections remain 
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stable over time.  Albeit less consistently, the fixed effects results in general 
reveal the presence of a negative relationship between credit access and the cost 
of capital.  
  
4.2. The cost of capital and financial development  
This section provides the regression estimates for the two measures of financial 
development. The econometric specification is given by Equation 3, and the 
model is discussed in greater detail in section 2.2. 
Table 6 reports six regressions results: financial development is proxied by the 
net interest margin in regressions 1-3 and by the lending interest rate in regressions 
4-6. The R-squared values increase substantially when revenue productivity and 
wage rate are included, improving the goodness of fit of the models. For both 
measures of financial development, the R-squared rises from around 0.07 to 0.67 
with the inclusion of the two controls. In general, the R-squared values can be 
seen as reasonable considering the fact that there could be substantial 
heterogeneity across countries. 
The net interest margin and the lending interest rate both appear with the expected 
positive and significant coefficients. The coefficients of both variables fall by 
around half with the inclusion of the revenue productivity and wage rate, but 
they remain significant. Since more developed financial markets are 
characterized by low net interest margin and relatively lower lending interest 
rate, these results indicate that firms in more financially developed countries 
have lower cost of capital. The coefficient of the net interest margin in regression 
3, which is our preferred specification, implies that increasing the net interest 
margin by one percentage point raises the cost of capital by 4%. Similarly, the 
coefficient of lending interest rate in regression 8 indicates that a one percentage 
point rise in the lending interest rate increases firms’ cost of capital by 0.8%. The 
last result thus confirms the strong positive correlation between the cost of 
financial capital and physical capital. Overall, the results indicate that cross-
country differences in financial access are also negatively correlated with firms’ 
cost of capital.  
Revenue productivity and the wage rate have the expected positive and 
significant coefficients in all of the regressions. In addition to the firm-level wage 
rate variable, I have also included the country average of the wage rate to 
capture cross-country differences in labor cost. Table 6 shows that the country 
average wage rate is significant only in the first two regressions in which firm-
level wage rate is not controlled. Once firm-specific wage rate is controlled, 
average wage rate is insignificant, indicating that wage rate differences are not as 




Table 6. Financial development and the cost of capital; OLS regression results. 
 Net interest margin Lending interest rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Financial development  0.070*** 0.046*** 0.040*** 0.015*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 
 (0.022) (0.014) (0.014) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
Revenue productivity, log  1.150*** 1.165***  1.150*** 1.165*** 
  (0.029) (0.030)  (0.033) (0.033) 
Wage rate, log   0.304***   0.308*** 
   (0.020)   (0.021) 
Capital account openness -0.053 -0.013 -0.010 -0.054 -0.010 -0.009 
 (0.057) (0.027) (0.028) (0.063) (0.027) (0.027) 
Consumption price level, log 0.083 -0.152 -0.181 0.167 -0.108 -0.154 
 (0.174) (0.121) (0.111) (0.185) (0.120) (0.105) 
Investment price level, log -0.271* -0.032 -0.072 -0.196 0.021 -0.003 
 (0.148) (0.093) (0.092) (0.163) (0.097) (0.085) 
Trade openness  0.000 0.002** 0.002* -0.000 0.002** 0.001* 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Country average wage rate  0.276*** 0.208*** -0.080 0.342*** 0.263*** -0.027 
 (0.079) (0.066) (0.061) (0.104) (0.069) (0.062) 
Labor market rigidity  -0.002 -0.000 0.000 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Constant 0.356 -0.648 -0.256 -0.004 -0.852* -0.475 
 (0.683) (0.470) (0.420) (0.817) (0.505) (0.425) 
       
Observations 20,633 20,633 20,620 19,315 19,315 19,302 
R-squared 0.069 0.640 0.669 0.074 0.639 0.669 
Notes: The dependent variable in all regressions is log (CK1). The top row indicates which indicator of 
financial development is used in the regressions. Industry dummies are included in all regressions. 
Standard errors given in parenthesis are corrected for clustering by country groups. The asterisks *, ** and 
*** respectively represent significance at the levels of 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01.  
Coming to other control variables, capital account openness appears insignificant 
indicating that access to finance from foreign sources has no effect on the cost of 
capital once other factors are controlled. The investment and consumption price 
levels also appear insignificant although, as components of the relative price of 
physical capital, they are expected to affect demand for capital.14 Similarly, trade 
openness and labor market rigidity appear with insignificant coefficients once 





                                                 
14 Consumption price level is expected to have a positive coefficient since it raises the demand for 
capital by increasing the return from each unit of capital. Investment price level will have the 
opposite effect. 
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5. Robustness tests   
5.1. External financing and the cost of capital   
In the analysis so far, financial access at firm level is measured using different 
indicators of credit access. In this section, I test the robustness of the results 
reported in section 4.1 for alternative ways of measuring financial access. Instead 
of credit access, I use a broader measure of external financing which includes 
credit from financial institutions as well as trade credit, loans from informal 
lending institutions, loans from social networks and other sources.   
There are two imperatives for testing the robustness of the results for a more 
general indicator of external financing. Firstly, the data shows that credit 
financing is a relatively small component of external financing. On average, firms 
finance around 64% of their investment expenditure and 52% of their working 
capital needs from external financing. Since formal credit financing contributes to 
only around one fifth of total financing needs, it evidently constitutes a small 
component of firms’ external financing. This makes it important to examine if the 
relationship found between cost of capital and credit access can also hold when a 
broader measure of financial access is used.  
The second imperative is related to data quality. As can be seen from Table 1, 
data for credit access is missing for 18-30% of the observations. One possible 
reason for the large number of missing values is that respondents find it difficult 
to provide detailed figures for specific sources of borrowing. Since credit 
financing is calculated by adding up credit from domestic banks, foreign banks, 
and other financial institutions, it is more likely to be missing when firms do not 
have detailed credit data. On the other hand, data for the proportion of internal 
funds in investment and working capital expenditure is missing for less than 10% 
of the observations. Our alternative measure of external financing is thus 
calculated as one minus the proportion of credit financing sourced from internal 
funds. 
Table 7 provides four regression results using external financing as an indicator 
of financial access. OLS and IV estimates are reported only for the regression in 
which revenue productivity as well as wage rate differences are included. The 
results show that both measures of external financing have mostly significant 
and always negative coefficients. Comparing the OLS coefficients of external 
financing in Table 7 with the coefficients of credit access reported in tables 3 and 
4, credit access appears to have smaller coefficients. It is, however, difficult to 
interpret these results since they could simply be the results of differences in the 
bias instead of the true coefficient of financial access. For the IV estimates, 
external financing in investment has a coefficient of -1.2 which is very close to the 
value of -1.1 reported in Table 3 for credit access in investment. However, the IV 
coefficient for external financing in working capital is -0.9, somewhat smaller 
than the value of -1.2 found for credit access as reported in Table 4. Overall, the 
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IV results do not appear to be substantially different when financial access is 
measured with a broader indicator of use of external financing. It can thus be 
concluded that improvements in external financing are associated with lower 
cost of capital.  
Table 7: External financing and the cost of capital, OLS and IV regression results. 
 External finance in investment  External finance in working capital  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Financial access  -0.037** -1.214** -0.033* -0.912*** 
 (0.015) (0.480) (0.017) (0.238) 
Revenue productivity, log 1.169*** 1.149*** 1.183*** 1.186*** 
 (0.007) (0.015) (0.007) (0.009) 
Wage rate, log 0.261*** 0.250*** 0.244*** 0.253*** 
 (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.011) 
Constant -1.439*** -0.766** -1.387*** -1.190*** 
 (0.198) (0.329) (0.175) (0.188) 
     
Observations 19,914 16,277 19,317 15,886 
R-squared 0.694 0.593 0.694 0.647 
Hansen's J chi2 test statistic for 
overidentifying restrictions 
 1.344  3.144 
Sig. overidentifying restric. test.  0.719  0.370 
GMM C statistic chi2 test stat. for 
exogeneity 
 7.633  16.30 
Sig. exogeneity test  0.006  0.000 
Estimator    OLS IV OLS IV 
Notes: The dependent variable in all regressions is log (CK1). The top row indicates which indicator of 
external finance is used in the regressions. Country-industry dummies are included in all regressions. 
Robust standard errors are given in parenthesis. The asterisks *, ** and *** respectively represent significance 
at the levels of 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01.  
 
5.2. Outliers and influential observations, countries  
In this section, I check the robustness of the results reported so far for two kinds 
of potential bias. Firstly, it is important to check if the results are not driven by a 
few outlying and influential observations. The descriptive statistics presented in 
section 4 show that there are relatively large differences between mean and 
median values of the cost of capital, indicating the presence of extreme values. 
Although I expect the log-transformation will have alleviated this problem, it is 
nonetheless important to check the robustness of the results to alternative 
methods of estimation. The second cause of concern is that the results could be 
driven by observations from a few countries. It is possible that the results are not 
homogeneous for all countries, but are being driven by data from one or a few 
influential countries. This is particularly important because summary statistics 
indicate possible cross-country differences in measurement.  
To handle the outlying and influential observations problem, I re-estimate the 
key regression results using a regression technique that less liable to such biases. 
Specifically, I use the median least square (MLS) technique in which standard 
 28
errors are minimized from the median instead of from the mean as in standard 
OLS regression technique. The median least square regression has the advantage 
of minimizing the effect of influential observations since the median, unlike the 
mean, is not affected by outliers. I provide median least square estimates for 
specifications given by Equation 2 and Equation 3.  
To test if influential countries are driving the results, I re-estimate the regression 
given by Equation 3 by dropping one country at a time. Doing so is not as 
important for the regression provided by Equation 2 since country effects are 
included.  
Table 8 reports the median least square regression results. The first two columns 
report OLS and IV regression results for credit use in investment for the model 
provided by Equation 2. Columns 3-4 provide OLS and IV regression results for 
the same model but using credit use in working capital as an indicator of credit 
access. The last two columns report OLS regression results for Equation 3 in 
which financial development is used. Revenue productivity and wage rate are 
included in all regressions.  
From the first two regressions, the OLS and median least square (MLS) 
regressions give very similar results. The coefficient of credit in investment 
changed only marginally from -0.141 in the OLS estimation to -0.138 in the MLS 
estimation. However, the IV regression results for the same indicator of credit 
access are surprisingly different between the two estimators. GMM IV estimation 
yields a significant coefficient of -1.11 for credit in investment whereas the MLS 
estimate gives a substantially smaller coefficient of -0.68 which turns 
insignificant. It appears that the OLS results for this indicator of credit access 
have been affected by some extreme values.  
The OLS and MLS results are more consistent for the second indicator of credit 
access. The OLS coefficient for credit in working capital is -0.19 and the MLS 
coefficient for the same model is -0.21, and both of them are significant. The two 
estimators yield rather different coefficients when credit access is instrumented, 
but the difference is not pronounced; GMM yields a coefficient of -1.12 whereas 
MLS gives a coefficient of -0.84, both of which are significant.  
The two indicators of financial development, the net interest margin and the 
lending interest rate, come out with significant and positive coefficients when the 
MLS estimator is used. The MLS coefficients are somewhat smaller than those of 
OLS, but the difference is not notable. According to the MLS estimator, a rise of 
the lending interest rate by one percentage point is associated with a rise in 
firms’ cost of capital by 0.6%, which is smaller than the 0.8% rise predicted by the 




Overall, the median least square results indicate the need for caution in 
interpreting the results found using standard OLS and IV GMM estimators. 
However, they confirm the negative relationship between the cost of capital and 
financial access for most indicators of financial access.  
Table 8: Median least squares regression results 
 Credit in investment Credit in work. capital  





 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Access to finance  -0.138*** -0.676 -0.210*** -0.844** 0.034*** 0.006*** 
 (0.025) (0.482) (0.026) (0.353) (0.003) (0.001) 
Revenue 
productivity, log 
1.233*** 1.261*** 1.217*** 1.240*** 1.182*** 1.188*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) 
Wage rate, log 0.235*** 0.244*** 0.231*** 0.237*** 0.259*** 0.262*** 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.008) (0.010) 
Constant -1.668*** -1.358*** -1.279*** -1.299*** -0.286*** -0.453*** 
 (0.266) (0.272) (0.269) (0.267) (0.107) (0.116) 
       
Observations 14,963 12,568 17,646 14,536 20,620 19,302 
Estimator    OLS IV OLS IV OLS OLS 
Notes: The dependent variable in all regressions is log (CK1). The top row indicates which indicator of 
financial access is used in the regressions. All explanatory variables included in the original regressions are 
also included in the median least square regressions. In regressions 2 and 4 predicted values of credit access 
are used and thus are equivalent to IV estimates. The standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust 
bootstrapped standard errors. The asterisks *, ** and *** respectively represent significance at the levels of 
0.1, 0.05 and 0.01.  
Finally, the sensitivity tests for the coefficients of financial development in which 
Equation 3 is estimated by dropping one country at a time are reported in 
Appendix D. Overall, dropping countries turn by turn leads to only minor 
fluctuations in the coefficients of the two measures of financial development 
which remain significant in all cases. It can thus be safely concluded that the 
results are not strongly driven by observations from one of the countries in the 
dataset.   
 
7. Conclusion 
Financial access constraints have been claimed to be one of the most binding 
obstacles for firm growth. This paper provides new evidence on the effect of 
financial access on firms’ cost of capital using an international dataset that 
primarily covers small- and medium-sized firms in developing countries. The 
paper measures financial access using firm-level indicators of credit access as 
well as country-level indicators of financial development. The results show that 
both firm-level measures of credit access and country-level indicators of financial 
development reduce firms’ cost of capital.  
The results thus suggest that financial access allows firms to grow and lower 
their marginal revenue.  However, the results also reveal that the channel in 
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which credit is allocated is not necessarily efficiency-enhancing. Politically 
connected firms are found to have better access to credit, a finding also reported 
in other studies (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Brandt and Li, 2003; Zhou, 2009; 
Guariglia et al., 2011). When political connections are used as instruments, 
predicted values of credit access have a large effect on the cost of capital. Thus 
political connections not only affect firms’ credit access, but also determine their 
cost of capital and hence their ability to grow. These results suggest that the 
allocation of credit through such channels could be one reason why there are 
large dispersions in the cost of capital within countries, indicating substantial 
misallocation of capital. 
Overall, the results highlight of the importance of improving firms’ financial 
access. Well-developed financial markets will make more finance available at low 
cost, enabling small firms to build up their capital stock. Further, competitive 
financial markets are also likely to improve allocative efficiency by directing 
capital towards firms that promise the highest return instead of to those with the 
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Table A.1. List and description of variables.  
 






Cost of capital 
CK1 
Cost of capital estimated based on the average revenue 
product of capital.  
 Firm 
Generated using data 
from WBES dataset 
CK2 
Cost of capital estimated based on the marginal revenue 
product of capital under Cobb-Douglas technology.     Firm 
Generated using data 
from WBES dataset 
CK3 
Cost of capital estimated based on the marginal revenue 
product of capital under firm-specific Cobb-Douglas 
technology.    
 Firm 
Generated using data 
from WBES dataset 
Access to finance 
NetIntMargin – Net interest 
margin  
 
Net interest margin is an indicator of the wedge between 
lending and borrowing interest rates. It is measured as 
the country average of banks’ net interest revenue (total 
interest and other revenue on loans) minus the interest 
costs on deposits a percentage of its interest-bearing 
assets.  
2001-2007 Country Beck et al. (2009) 
IntLend - Lending interest 
rate 
The lending rate in IFS (line 60p) is defined as the bank 
rate that usually meets the short- and medium-term 
financing needs of the private sector. 
2001-2007 Country 
Compiled by IFS, 
accessed from WDI 
database 
CreditInv – proportion of 
credit financing in total 
investment expenditure 
The proportion of credit from bank and non-bank 
institutions in total investment expenditure.     Firm 
Generated using data 
from WBES dataset 
CreditWrkCap - proportion 
of credit financing in 
working capital  
The proportion of credit from bank and non-bank 
institutions in total working capital needs.   Firm 
Generated using data 
from WBES dataset 
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ExtFinInv - proportion of 
external financing in 
investment expenditure   
The proportion of external sources of financing used in 
total investment expenditure.    Firm 
Generated using data 
from WBES dataset 
ExtFinWrkCap - proportion 
of external financing in 
working capital 
The proportion of external sources of financing used in 
total working capital needs.   
   
 Firm 
Generated using data 
from WBES dataset 
IntFundInv - proportion of 
internal funds in investment 
expenditure   
The proportion of internal sources of financing used in 
total investment expenditure.    Firm WBES dataset 
IntFundWrkCap - 
proportion of internal funds 
in working capital 
The proportion of internal sources of financing used in 
total working capital needs.   
   
 Firm WBES dataset 
Controls 
tfpr – log of  (total factor) 
revenue productivity 
Given by Equation 7 in section 3.1. 
 
 Firm 
Generated using data 
from WBES dataset 
 
lnWageRate– log of wage 
rate in manufacturing  
Average wage rate of the firm in USD, calculated as total 
labor cost divided by average employment (after the 
later is adjusted to include temporary employment).   
 Firm  
Generated using data 
from WBES dataset 
lnWageManufAv– log of 
average wage rate in 
manufacturing  
Country-average of the wage rate in USD.   Country 
Generated using data 
from WBES dataset 
KAopen - capital account 
openness 
Measures the intensity of capital account openness, and 
is generated by combining four indicators of openness of 
cross-border financial transactions. Higher values 
indicate more capital account openness.  
 
2001-2007 Country Chinn and Ito (2008) 
TrOpen - trade openness 
The value of exports plus imports as a percentage of 
GDP in constant prices.   
 
2001-2007 Country Heston et al. (2009) 
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LabRigid- labor market 
rigidity indicator  
 
The labor market rigidity index is an average of three 
other indices: i) difficulty of hiring index, ii) rigidity of 
hours index, and iii) difficulty of firing index. Ranges 
between 0 (less rigid) to 100 (more rigid).  
2008-2009 Country World Bank (2010) 
lnPY – log of consumption 
price level 
The price level of consumption relative to U.S. price 
level.  
2001-2007 
Country Heston et al. (2009) 
  
lnPK – log of investment 
price level 
The price level of investment relative to U.S. price level. 2001-2007 
Country Heston et al. (2009) 
  
* Notes: Data are averaged over many years to avoid measurement problems related to year to year fluctuations. The years 2001-2007 are selected because the 
firm-level WBES dataset is collected over the years 2001-2009. The averaging is not extended to 2009 to avoid capturing short-term changes in the financial sector 
that ensued the 2008 financial crisis, since the focus here is on the long-term level of financial development. When variables are not generated from the WBES 
dataset, the time period is not specified because data is collected in different years across countries. Appendix B shows the survey year for each country covered.  
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Appendix B  
Table B.1. Descriptive statistics by country.  
  
 




















1 Albania 2007 32 4.09 0.97 1.60 0.47 3.21 0.78 0.00 0.00 4.00 14.44 
2 Algeria 2002 165 9.02 2.80 3.61 1.03 7.42 1.93 0.22 0.14 5.00 8.32 
3 Angola 2006 132 2.68 0.95 0.97 0.30 1.61 0.37 0.01 0.01 7.00 68.10 
4 Argentina 2006 375 7.14 2.35 2.58 0.88 4.83 1.23 0.01 0.11 7.00 18.74 
5 Armenia 2009 41 4.10 0.99 1.65 0.39 3.43 0.65 . . 6.00 19.90 
6 Bangladesh 2002 889 2.94 1.03 0.94 0.35 1.91 0.52 0.30 0.34 3.00 15.42 
7 Belarus 2008 43 10.43 1.67 3.59 0.60 7.36 1.07 0.00 0.00 7.00 21.93 
8 Bolivia 2006 196 2.06 0.79 0.83 0.31 1.47 0.44 0.12 0.21 5.00 16.31 
9 Bosnia & Herz. 2009 68 1.07 0.49 0.39 0.18 0.60 0.17 . . 6.00 8.38 
10 Botswana 2006 106 5.18 1.23 1.84 0.42 4.36 0.50 0.12 0.08 6.00 16.07 
11 Brazil 2003 1400 6.67 3.79 2.17 1.15 5.05 2.58 0.22 0.30 13.00 56.06 
12 Bulgaria 2007 331 8.07 2.48 3.07 0.86 6.02 1.53 0.16 0.17 5.00 9.33 
13 Burkina Faso 2006 30 2.38 0.60 0.93 0.25 1.03 0.17 0.19 0.12 6.00 . 
14 Burundi 2006 60 1.90 0.56 0.80 0.21 1.30 0.27 0.15 0.20 10.00 17.88 
15 Cameroon 2006 98 3.29 1.23 1.32 0.47 2.42 0.74 0.13 0.19 5.00 17.52 
16 Cape Verde 2006 40 1.58 0.91 0.65 0.33 0.92 0.36 0.09 0.11 4.00 12.02 
17 Chile 2004 563 3.12 1.09 1.35 0.47 1.92 0.52 0.20 0.32 5.00 7.76 
18 China 2003 1178 4.42 1.80 1.47 0.60 4.07 1.57 0.24 0.31 2.00 5.89 
19 Colombia 2006 486 5.97 2.40 2.41 0.94 3.75 1.15 0.21 0.25 5.00 15.74 
20 Congo, DR 2006 131 2.03 1.02 0.87 0.45 1.21 0.52 0.06 0.04 . 46.72 
21 Croatia 2007 226 3.95 1.35 1.45 0.53 2.22 0.77 0.26 0.22 4.00 10.88 
22 Czech Rep. 2009 50 2.60 1.60 0.88 0.56 1.45 0.98 . . 2.00 6.15 
23 Ecuador 2006 235 4.30 1.66 1.96 0.66 2.91 0.88 0.20 0.19 8.00 12.45 
24 Egypt 2004 588 1.62 0.44 0.58 0.16 1.12 0.21 0.05 0.07 2.00 13.18 
25 El Salvador 2003 460 6.06 2.49 2.40 0.94 4.04 1.38 0.33 0.28 7.00 . 
26 Estonia 2009 60 4.63 1.34 1.53 0.53 3.15 0.63 . . 4.00 6.01 
27 Ethiopia 2002 222 1.75 0.57 0.62 0.18 1.27 0.29 0.19 0.22 4.00 7.86 
28 Gambia 2006 22 3.03 0.80 0.94 0.31 1.81 0.20 0.08 0.08 8.00 29.49 
29 Georgia 2008 54 3.11 0.79 1.26 0.38 2.06 0.34 0.00 0.00 10.00 26.20 
30 Ghana 2007 145 3.12 1.57 1.07 0.53 1.97 0.70 0.09 0.11 9.00 . 
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31 Guatemala 2003 418 4.35 2.00 1.65 0.72 3.07 1.33 0.20 0.15 10.00 14.75 
32 Guinea 2006 42 4.16 1.47 1.45 0.48 3.34 0.93 0.01 0.03 . . 
33 Guinea Bissau 2006 23 0.67 0.66 0.25 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.00 0.00 . . 
34 Guyana 2004 144 1.18 0.30 0.55 0.13 0.57 0.16 0.27 0.19 4.00 15.22 
35 Honduras 2003 372 4.54 1.73 1.72 0.60 3.29 1.03 0.30 0.30 7.00 20.00 
36 Hungary 2009 64 10.20 3.71 3.88 1.28 6.53 1.81 . . 6.00 10.06 
37 India 2002 1582 2.71 0.97 1.02 0.34 2.20 0.72 0.00 . 3.00 11.62 
38 Indonesia 2003 373 14.05 5.84 5.20 1.95 11.36 4.29 0.21 0.20 5.00 16.06 
39 Ivory Coast 2009 42 13.22 2.81 5.57 1.09 11.28 2.19 0.06 0.10 5.00 . 
40 Jordan 2006 97 3.82 1.28 1.30 0.48 3.43 1.09 0.10 0.17 3.00 9.02 
41 Kazakhstan 2009 122 4.84 0.85 1.91 0.33 3.22 0.37 . . 6.00 . 
42 Kyrgyzstan 2003 83 1.46 1.11 0.55 0.41 0.58 0.36 0.02 0.09 5.00 26.52 
43 Laos 2006 215 3.32 0.98 1.04 0.31 2.75 0.69 0.23 0.29 3.00 28.65 
44 Latvia 2009 60 5.72 1.77 2.05 0.57 4.59 0.83 . . 3.00 8.04 
45 Lithuania 2004 71 8.94 4.59 3.18 1.55 5.99 2.97 0.16 0.10 3.00 6.47 
46 Macedonia 2009 74 4.24 0.96 1.43 0.34 2.92 0.53 . . 6.00 14.26 
47 Madagascar 2005 114 6.04 2.08 2.22 0.76 4.40 1.28 0.13 0.12 9.00 28.82 
48 Malawi 2005 124 8.19 2.44 3.35 0.82 5.86 1.69 0.14 0.19 13.00 40.79 
49 Mauritania 2006 71 1.90 0.68 0.77 0.26 1.15 0.30 0.04 0.08 7.00 22.30 
50 Mauritius 2005 105 6.23 1.88 2.34 0.67 4.12 0.71 0.29 0.30 2.00 21.16 
51 Mexico 2006 741 4.14 1.26 1.59 0.46 2.82 0.82 0.02 0.02 7.00 8.60 
52 Moldova 2009 87 5.11 1.42 1.75 0.60 3.94 0.83 . . 8.00 21.24 
53 Mongolia 2009 110 1.92 0.64 0.77 0.24 1.29 0.38 . . 6.00 30.80 
54 Morocco 2004 711 3.72 1.71 1.24 0.53 1.74 0.57 0.20 0.04 4.00 12.61 
55 Namibia 2006 93 2.59 1.12 0.94 0.40 1.82 0.65 0.20 0.10 6.00 12.73 
56 Nepal 2009 72 2.79 0.58 1.19 0.21 2.04 0.25 0.17 0.36 3.00 5.76 
57 Nicaragua 2003 396 2.95 1.33 1.14 0.50 2.20 0.88 0.21 0.19 8.00 14.66 
58 Niger 2005 29 13.97 5.01 5.49 1.62 12.05 4.56 0.13 0.14 6.00 . 
59 Pakistan 2002 740 3.73 0.83 1.34 0.29 3.16 0.52 0.10 0.07 3.00 9.77 
60 Panama 2006 97 5.99 1.36 2.35 0.55 4.59 0.80 0.28 0.26 3.00 9.37 
61 Paraguay 2006 108 4.57 0.99 1.66 0.39 3.74 0.53 0.07 0.12 10.00 33.65 
62 Peru 2006 216 5.06 1.66 2.33 0.75 3.72 0.94 0.31 0.29 6.00 23.39 
63 Philippines 2003 455 3.62 1.49 1.24 0.52 1.31 0.41 0.14 0.10 5.00 9.96 
64 Poland 2003 64 1.64 1.33 0.63 0.52 0.79 0.65 0.18 0.13 4.00 9.60 
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65 Romania 2009 60 4.98 1.13 1.83 0.38 3.65 0.45 . . 7.00 25.54 
66 Russia 2009 244 8.98 3.69 3.37 1.34 6.71 1.86 . . 7.00 12.74 
67 Rwanda 2006 42 3.73 0.86 1.60 0.37 2.48 0.48 0.17 0.24 8.00 16.49 
68 Senegal 2007 180 2.56 1.23 1.11 0.44 1.56 0.60 0.04 0.04 5.00 . 
69 Serbia 2009 104 2.68 0.96 1.11 0.33 1.89 0.49 . . . 18.53 
70 Slovakia 2009 40 4.16 1.02 1.62 0.39 3.03 0.68 . . 3.00 8.77 
71 South Africa 2007 610 6.27 1.80 2.44 0.62 3.25 0.90 0.14 0.09 6.00 12.96 
72 Sri Lanka 2004 363 4.91 1.53 1.86 0.55 4.01 1.13 0.18 0.26 4.00 13.30 
73 Swaziland 2006 58 12.96 4.29 4.76 1.69 6.48 2.09 0.09 0.10 6.00 12.77 
74 Syria 2003 38 0.59 0.21 0.19 0.07 0.31 0.03 0.00 0.00 2.00 8.45 
75 Tajikistan 2008 56 3.15 0.52 1.14 0.21 2.81 0.37 0.00 0.00 9.00 20.38 
76 Tanzania 2006 190 3.34 1.02 1.36 0.38 2.76 0.79 0.09 0.10 6.00 16.01 
77 Thailand 2004 1203 4.69 1.79 1.54 0.61 3.23 1.21 0.59 0.47 3.00 6.54 
78 Turkey 2008 421 4.69 1.35 1.68 0.50 3.40 0.80 0.00 0.00 10.00 . 
79 Uganda 2006 221 2.05 0.82 0.75 0.28 1.31 0.42 0.07 0.07 12.00 19.82 
80 Ukraine 2008 160 4.97 1.54 1.77 0.53 3.44 0.63 0.00 0.00 6.00 19.74 
81 Uruguay 2006 152 6.26 2.18 2.92 0.96 4.55 1.37 0.09 0.07 7.00 40.19 
82 Uzbekistan 2008 80 6.41 1.66 2.50 0.52 5.02 0.63 0.00 0.00 6.00 . 
83 Vietnam 2005 1030 1.59 0.79 0.58 0.29 0.88 0.36 0.32 0.29 3.00 10.15 
84 Zambia 2002 100 1.38 0.69 0.65 0.27 0.41 0.09 0.23 0.17 11 33.28 















Table C.1. U.S. shares of capital and labor.  
 
Industry Name (ISIC Code) Capital share Labor share  
Food products and beverages (15) 0.500 0.500 
Textiles (17) 0.283 0.717 
Wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing of fur (18) 0.283 0.717 
Leather, leather products and footwear (19) 0.283 0.717 
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing (21 & 22) 0.379 0.621 
Chemicals and chemical products (24) 0.564 0.436 
Rubber, plastic and other non-metal products (25 & 26) 0.372 0.628 
Basic metals, fabricated metals and machinery (27, 28 & 29) 0.310 0.690 
Electronic products (30, 31 & 32) 0.320 0.680 
Motor vehicles and  trailers (34) 0.317 0.683 
Wood and products of wood (20 & 36  ) 0.293 0.707 
Notes: The shares of capital and labor are taken from the STAN database and are averaged over 
the years 2001-2007. Labor share is calculated as the value added share of labor compensation; 
and the share of capital is calculated as 1 minus labor share. The level of detail of the industrial 
classification is determined by the availability of data in the WBES dataset. When two or more 2-
digit ISIC industries are combined because the WBES dataset does not provide more detailed 






















































































































Notes: The regression is given by Equation 3, and the dependent variable is log(CK1). 
The dotted lines indicate the boundaries for 95% confidence interval. 
 
Figure D.1. Sensitivity of coefficients of net interest margin for dropping one 



































































































Notes: The regression is given by Equation 3, and the dependent variable is log(CK1). 
The dotted lines indicate the boundaries for 95% confidence interval. 
 
Figure D.2. Sensitivity of coefficients of lending interest rate for dropping one 
country at a time.  
 

